



Pakistan-Africa Institute for
Development & Research



RWANDA-DRC PEACE DEAL: STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE & IMPLICATIONS FOR PAKISTAN

Foreword by

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
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Foreword



Senator Mushahid Hussain Sayed

President, Pakistan-Africa Institute for Development and Research

On June 27, 2025, President Trump completed a “hatrick of ceasefires” in a conflict situation in the Global South when he invited the Foreign Ministers of Rwanda and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to sign a ceasefire in Washington D.C. to end the long-standing conflict between the two neighbours. This was, in fact, a unique ceasefire within 6 weeks since on May 10, 2025, President Trump had done a similar diplomatic achievement by getting Pakistan and India to agree on a ceasefire, followed by initiating the ceasefire between Iran and Israel to end their 12-day war on June 24, 2025.

The ceasefire between Rwanda and DRC is probably the single most important American diplomatic achievement in Africa in decades, signaling that Africa is no longer on the back burner of US foreign policy. Interestingly, there are remarkable similarities between the situation in Africa and the scenario in South Asia, both of which were defused and stabilized, courtesy the diplomatic intervention of President Trump.

President Trump’s intervention in these 3 conflicts within a space of 6 weeks also underlines the failure of multilateral institutions and multilateral diplomacy to either resolve or defuse conflicts, hence, it is no accident that the post-World War II international order is unravelling slowly but surely. In the new emerging multipolar world, the Big-3 (United States, China and Russia) are the major players, but there are also Middle Powers emerging that are playing an active role in Asia and Africa. Pakistan is one of these emerging Muslim Middle Powers along with Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Indonesia, while in the context of Africa, there is a proactive role of India, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Qatar, the latter, in fact, facilitating talks between DRC and the M23 rebels who are backed by Rwanda.

For Pakistan, there is a two-fold relevance of the Rwanda-DRC Deal, namely, the impact on Pakistan-American relations and Pakistan’s quest for an Africa policy.

In the current international context,” Critical Minerals” are the “New Oil” just as in the 20th century, Oil was the critical factor in determining strategic interests of major powers. In today’s world, Critical Minerals are now playing that role. The Democratic Republic of Congo has an estimated \$ 24 trillion of mineral wealth while Pakistan is estimated to have natural resources of \$ 6 trillion.

Pakistan has a long-standing relationship with Africa. The Father of the Nation, the Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah only visited two countries, the United Kingdom for his education, and a visit to Egypt in Africa in 1946 just before the creation of Pakistan. Africa is also etched in the Pakistani popular consciousness because Pakistan’s popular revolutionary poet, Faiz

Ahmed Faiz, wrote one of his most famous poems ‘Come back, Oh Africa’ in January 1955, where he yearned for the resurgence of Africa after liberation from the colonial yoke. Pakistan has had an excellent track record of supporting liberation struggles in Africa whether it was Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Eritrea, Somalia, South Africa or Zimbabwe. There is another little-known Pakistan connection with Africa: in Pakistan’s quest for security when Pakistan was pursuing its nuclear programme, it first sought and received uranium from Niger in the early 1970s.

Today, as the Global South celebrates the “Bandung Spirit”, the 70th anniversary of the holding of the Asian-African summit in Indonesia, Pakistan-Africa ties are being forged closer together. In this regard, it is my pleasure to record that we took the initiative to establish the first and only think tank dedicated to Africa in Pakistan, the Pakistan-Africa Institute for Development & Research (PAIDAR), which has now become the principal non-governmental platform for promoting people to people ties between Pakistan and Africa. It is no exaggeration to state that within a year of its foundation, PAIDAR has been contributing to put Africa onto the Pakistan policy making national radar as a major plank for Pakistan’s foreign policy. Pakistan is playing its role as one of the harbingers of the emerging Global South, a role that is being played at the governmental level by the Foreign Office and in the United Nations Security Council by Pakistan’s able diplomats, and at the popular level by PAIDAR.

Senator Mushahid Hussain Sayed

President, Pakistan-Africa Institute
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Summary

President Trump stopped three wars in six weeks—Pakistan-India on 10 May, Iran-Israel on 24 June, and Rwanda-DRC on 27 June—using quick phone calls or posts on X instead of the normal U.S. official channels. By acting this way, he outpaced the United Nations and regional blocs, claimed credit for averting a nuclear crisis, and opened space for a fresh U.S.–Iran deal, and sought peace in Africa through a “minerals for security” deal.

Trump’s pattern is clear: bypass bureaucracy, expect a political and national payoff, and rely on confidants such as Vice-President J. D. Vance, businessman Steve Witkoff, or his daughter’s father-in-law, Massad Boulus. The style matches his deal-focused worldview: strike fast, show results, use economic diplomacy rather than troops.

Africa is now also a major arena for that approach. Washington will host five African leaders on 9–11 July, followed by a and a larger Africa summit in September; Beijing welcomed 53 leaders in 2024 for its China Africa Summit and promised \$50 billion assistance plus training for 6000 army officers; Putin met 17 African leaders in 2023 during Russia-Africa Summit and wrote off \$23 billion of African debt. At the same time young coup leaders in Africa, symbolised by Burkina Faso’s Captain Ibrahim Traoré, are reshaping the African discourse. Qatar is already helping Washington by talking to Congo’s M23 rebels, showing how mid-sized partners can secure leverage without sending troops or huge funds.

In Africa, India, Turkey, the UAE, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia are also opening embassies, flight routes, and investment offices, giving new shape to the field. The U.S.-brokered Rwanda-DRC ceasefire matters because it secures cobalt, copper, and lithium—critical minerals which are the “new oil” that powers phones, cars, and technology. Achieving what the African Union and U.N. failed to do raises U.S. influence and signals it can still compete with Beijing and Moscow in Africa.

Congo’s deal mirrors Pakistan’s situation. Trump intervened personally in both theatres; both regions suffer long proxy wars; and both have huge mineral wealth. Experts value Congo’s critical minerals at \$24 billion and Pakistan’s at as much as \$6 trillion, placing Islamabad and Kinshasa in what can be called the “Trump Critical Minerals Club”.

Minerals now reshape Pakistan-U.S. ties. Washington will engage with Pakistan not only by its armed forces, as during the Cold War, but also by access to rare metals. Mining needs security and stability, so the U.S. will prefer a calmer South Asia, thwarting any Indo-Israeli axis against Pakistan and Islamabad-Washington ties will balance India’s quest to be a pivot in the ‘US Indo-Pacific Strategy’.

Although Pakistan’s record in Africa has been positive, no senior leader has paid a bilateral visit there in 25 years, and many embassies are staffed by ‘reluctant’ officers. Yet Islamabad has a good profile in Africa: Pakistan backed anti-colonial struggles, its troops served with distinction in U.N. peacekeeping missions, its doctors and navy won respect in disaster zones and anti-piracy patrols.

To build on that capital, Pakistan needs clear goals in six fields. First, trade: export pharmaceuticals and information-technology services. Second, security: offer low-cost military training, defence equipment, and capacity building. Third, education: give generous scholarships to African students. Fourth, the Blue Economy: schedule regular Pakistan Navy port calls across the Indian Ocean. Fifth, Soft Power: push sports, culture, tourism, and dubbed TV dramas in Swahili and French. Sixth, people-to-people links: hold media, think-tank, youth and women exchanges that deepen understanding and foster mutual trust.

Three initiatives can make a difference. First, renaming an Islamabad's educational Institution “Nelson Mandela University” would attract African students and teachers. Second, easing visas—starting with Somalia, whose citizens spend roughly \$250 million a year on medical trips to India—could redirect that money to Pakistani hospitals earning goodwill. Third, forming a roster of retired officers with U.N. field experience in Africa would let Pakistan send training teams.

PAIDAR can drive these efforts. As the only Pakistani think-tank focused on Africa, it can publish policy briefs, run publications, and track how the Big Three (U.S., China, Russia) or the Middle Powers like India, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar operate on the continent. PAIDAR could act as the government's “eyes and ears,” organise public-diplomacy drives, and plan exchange visits.

For all of this to work, Pakistan needs an institutional one-window Africa Initiative that joins ministries, launches concrete measures, pushes coordination, and checks deadlines through a cycle of Initiative, Coordination, and Implementation.

Trump’s Congo ceasefire shows that global clout now also includes accessing critical minerals. Africa is at the center stage, and Pakistan—rich in untapped natural resources and linked to Trump through the May ceasefire—can benefit if it moves deftly. By fixing past neglect, using its peacekeeping record, and following a whole-of-government plan mixing business, security, education, sea power, culture, and effective follow-up, Pakistan can turn the present scenario into enduring gain for its economy and diplomacy, and above all, the National interest and image of Pakistan.

I. Context of Rwanda-Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) Deal: The Trump Factor

- a) President Trump's "Hat-trick of Ceasefires": Within a span of 6 weeks, President Trump has been responsible for 3 major ceasefires of conflicts in Asia and Africa: May 10, Pakistan-India, June 24, Iran-Israel, and June 27, Rwanda-DRC, exerting his full Presidential authority behind these 3 respective ceasefires through his direct personal involvement.
- b) These ceasefires represent a different kind of American foreign policy approach combining what can be termed as the Trump Style of Diplomacy and President Trump's worldview. President Trump's New Style Diplomacy has 3 key ingredients as reflected in the unconventional manner in which he initiated and personally ensured the 3 ceasefires:
 - i. Act directly (using phone or Twitter), bypassing his own official system;
 - ii. Seek a quid pro quo that is personally beneficial for him, while also being a plus for American national interests (for example, in the case of Pakistan-India, taking credit for preventing a nuclear war, in the case of Iran-Israel, taking credit for 'eliminating' Iran's nuclear programme while paving the way for a potential US-Iran new nuclear deal, and in the case of Rwanda-DRC, seeking "Minerals for Security").
 - iii. In all 3 cases, instead of conventional bureaucratic channels, he used trusted confidants like Vice President J.D. Vance for Pakistan-India, his golf buddy and business partner Steve Witkoff for Iran-Israel, and in the case of Rwanda-DRC, his daughter's father-in-law, Massad Boulus.
- c) President Trump's Worldview reflects a mindset that is not representative of the traditional American Establishment security perspective, rather, it is more transactional, more focused on making deals and using economic diplomacy, rather than military means, to promote American interests abroad.

II. Africa's Changing Political Profile

- a) Africa is now a major arena for competition among the Big-3, (USA, China and Russia) with all 3 powers vying for influence, realising the strategic significance and mineral wealth of Africa. On July 9-11, President Trump is planning a summit with 5 African leaders in Washington, plus another bigger US Summit with African leaders being planned for September 2025. China has established a Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), which held a big Summit in September 2024 in Beijing hosted by President Xi Jinping, where 53 African countries, including 37 Heads of State/Government, took part. China has promised \$ 50 billion to be disbursed to Africa in the next 3 years, including training of 6000 army officers as well as an extensive

military and economic assistance programme. Russia held its own African Summit in July 2023 in Saint Petersburg where 17 African Heads of State/Government participated and Russia announced writing off \$ 23 billion in African debt.

- b) A new kind of African elite is emerging, mostly young military coup makers, who have, with their radical, anti-West and nationalistic mindset, taken over several African countries including Gabon, Niger, Mali, Guinea and Burkina Faso. The young and charismatic 37 year old military leader of Burkina Faso, Captain Ibrahim Traore, is the face of this new African ruling elite
- c) Apart from the Big-3, there are 5 other countries that are quite active in Africa today including India, Turkey, UAE, Qatar and Saudi Arabia. They are opening embassies in Africa as well as plane routes, investing money and also engaged and involved in various conflicts. For example, to supplement the US-sponsored Rwanda-DRC deal, Qatar is working behind the scenes at the behest of the United States to broker an agreement between the Government of Democratic Republic of Congo and the M23 Rebels, who are backed by Rwanda.

III. Strategic Significance of Rwanda-DRC Deal: Critical Minerals as the ‘New Oil’

- a) Critical Minerals have now emerged in the 21st century as the “new oil”, eagerly sought after by all major powers as they are pivotal to technological progress, scientific advancement and economic development. In the 20th century, oil and gas enjoyed such strategic significance.
- b) The United States achieved a big diplomatic success by brokering the Rwanda-DRC Deal since both the United Nations and the African Union had failed in this regard. So this deal adds immensely to the personal prestige of President Trump as well as the international clout, especially in Africa, of the United States.
- c) The United States has positioned itself centre-stage in Africa as the major influencer and potential deal maker which is willing, ready and able to compete directly for influence with both China and Russia.

IV. Ceasefire Similarities: Rwanda-DRC and Pakistan India

- a) In both cases, President Trump has intervened directly to enforce a ceasefire, whether it is Pakistan-India or Rwanda-DRC. So, in that respect, Pakistan and Congo as well as Rwanda see themselves as “friends of President Trump”. In the case of Pakistan-India, President Trump’s intervention has tilted towards Pakistan, since he equated Pakistan with India, treating them at par, plus he highlighted the core cause of conflict, namely, Kashmir, even offering his good offices for its solution, much to the chagrin of India.

- b) The second similarity is that both these ceasefires, Pakistan-India and Rwanda-DRC, are linked with long standing conflicts in an unstable and violent scenario in strategic regions of Asia and Africa respectively, where proxy wars are common to both.
- c) Critical Minerals is the third similarity between the two situations, also because the Democratic Republic of Congo has critical minerals worth \$ 24 trillion, while Pakistan is estimated to have Critical Minerals worth \$ 6 trillion.

V. Implications of Rwanda-DRC Deal for Pakistan

- a) With Critical Minerals becoming a ‘core interest’ of the United States, pivotal for its economy and technology, Pakistan’s strategic significance for the United States, like that of the Democratic Republic of Congo, will now be measured not just in military terms as in the past (Afghan war, Cold War), but, more importantly now, in also providing access to Critical Minerals. given that, it is a core American interest now.
- b) From a geoeconomic perspective, mineral mining is a long-term and tedious process, this also means that the United States would develop a strategic stake in Pakistan, given the access to Critical Minerals that the US badly needs.
- c) From a geopolitical perspective, the United States would be keen that there should be regional stability to provide a conducive environment for access to Critical Minerals which the United States seeks in Pakistan. Hence, the threat from India or any potential Indo-Israeli Axis would be thwarted and the Pakistan-US relationship will also help in maintaining balance in South Asia vis-a-vis India’s role in the ‘Indo-Pacific strategy’ and also help to thwart any threat from the emerging Indo-Israel axis.

VI. Pakistan’s historical track record on Africa:

- a) Past mistakes in Pakistan’s approach to Africa:
 - i. Africa was largely ignored with no Pakistani President, Prime Minister or even Foreign Minister going to Africa on a bilateral visit in the last 25 years;
 - ii. Pakistan has always sent second rate diplomats to its embassies in Africa who generally view their stations in Africa as a ‘punishment posting’;
 - iii. There has been an absence of Africa on Pakistan’s policy radar, plus a lack of understanding of African geopolitics and African geoeconomics.
- b) Unique Pluses of Pakistan:
 - i. Pakistan has an outstanding track record of consistently supporting African national liberation movements, ranging from Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco in the Maghreb to Eritrea and Somalia ,as well as Zimbabwe and South Africa;
 - ii. Pakistan’s image has been enhanced by the role of the Pakistan Army in UN peacekeeping operations in the various African countries during the past decades, including Pakistan Army medical missions as well as the role of Pakistan Navy in rescue operations as well as anti-piracy operations on the high seas;

- iii. Pakistani experts, educationists, administrators have also contributed to Africa's development and governance, particularly in those African countries which are part of the Commonwealth.
- iv. Pakistan also enjoys a lot of goodwill, respect and influence among the Muslim Business Elites in various African countries, particularly those who are of South Asian origin. These Muslim business elites are also embedded in African power structures.

VII. Pakistan's Africa Policy: What is to be done?

- a) Pakistan needs to have Strategic Clarity on Africa policy, which should focus on 6 major areas:
 - i. Economy (Pakistani pharma and IT professionals can be big export items from Pakistan to Africa);
 - ii. Security (African countries need military training, small arms/ammunition, capacity building and they should be provided with this access easily, which would result in low investment but high impact);
 - iii. Education (Pakistan should provide a large number of educational scholarships to African students for studying in Pakistani universities);
 - iv. Blue Economy (The Pakistan Navy could play a more proactive role with regular calls in various key ports in the Indian Ocean region);
 - v. Soft Power of Pakistan could be promoted through sports, culture, tourism and Pakistani TV serials that can be dubbed in various languages like Swahili or French to cater to local audiences;
 - vi. People-to-people relationships are pivotal to developing bonds among countries and interaction/exchange of ideas through media and think tanks can be very significant.
- b) In a concrete term, 3 key initiatives can be very beneficial for Pakistan for the future given the changing African political landscape which makes Africa and Pakistan partners in the emerging Global South:
 - i. Pakistan should rename one of the existing universities in Islamabad as the Nelson Mandela University, which should then become a hub for African students and teachers and it would be an institution where African students stay in a receptive environment in Pakistan and this would also make Pakistan into a friendly destination for students and teachers from Africa;
 - ii. Pakistan should also revise its outdated visa policy for African countries. For example, Pakistan enjoys tremendous goodwill in Somalia, where 24 Pakistan soldiers were murdered in June 2023 during the UN peacekeeping operation. However, there are restrictions of visa for Somalis with the result that affluent Somalis travel all the way to India for medical tourism, spending \$ 250 million annually in Indian hospitals for their medical treatment. If Pakistan opens up to Somalis for medical treatment, for instance, it will generate goodwill as well as

financial benefits for Pakistan. People from other African countries will also be willing to come to Pakistan for this purpose.

- iii. Pakistan should prepare a list of experienced and retired military officers and soldiers who served in Africa under the UN peacekeeping forces and they should become the 'core cadre' to provide military training and capacity building in small African countries that seek Pakistani assistance and this military relationship can be buttressed by selling military and defence equipment and arms as well. Pakistan could then have its ingress into African states, which could then be supplemented by contingents of 100-200 retired officers and soldiers (who have already served in Africa under UN Peacekeeping Forces) to African countries for their military training and capacity building in specific areas, which in turn, would earn tremendous goodwill, clout and influence for Pakistan that would be enduring as the military in African countries is often the 'centre of gravity' of the newly emerging African states.

VIII. Role of PAIDAR in promoting Pakistan's Africa Policy

a) As Pakistan's first and only think tank exclusively devoted to Africa with a team that understands Africa as also their linkages with African political elites, PAIDAR provides a platform for multi-faceted engagements with Africa cutting through bureaucratic red tape, acting as the intellectual rapid response arm for Africa of the Pakistani System. PAIDAR could accomplish the following tasks and act as a force-multiplier for the Government of Pakistan in promoting its Africa policy objectives:

- i. Prepare informed policy papers and publish a monthly magazine, both in print/online, which would have the objective of (a) promoting Pakistan-Africa ties, (b) showcase Pakistan's developmental support for Africa in different domains, (c) Subtly counter and debunk Indian propaganda, (d) monitor and provide updates/analyses of role of the Big-3 (US, China and Russia in Africa) plus the 5 other key Middle Powers engaged in Africa (India, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Qatar).
- ii. PAIDAR would effectively have a 3-in-1 role serving as: 1) "eyes and ears" of the government on issues pertaining to Africa, 2) acting as a forum for public diplomacy especially through its publications/outreach for the African audience, and 3) organize delegations, visits and events pertaining to Pakistan-Africa relations at the behest of the Government, without the Government of Pakistan being directly or overtly involved in that process.
- iii. PAIDAR could also help prepare, formulate and execute a strategic work plan under the theme: "Pakistan-Africa 2030 Outreach", basically a ideas and initiatives on what to do and how to do it for the next 5 years regarding Pakistan's Africa policy for which the potential is huge and opportunities are limitless.

b) However, Pakistan's Africa policy initiatives can only succeed if it becomes a one-window operation under a dedicated institutional mechanism that in turn would incorporate a whole-of-government approach based on a trilateral focus of taking Initiatives through on concrete issues, ensuring Coordination between different relevant departments of the Government, and, finally, ensuring its Implementation within a specified timeline.

Annexures

a. Profile of the Democratic Republic of Congo

1. General Overview

Location	Central Africa
Capital	Kinshasa
Population	Approx. 100 million (2025 est.)
Area	Approx. 2.34 million km² (2nd largest in Africa)
Political System	Semi-presidential republic
President	Félix Tshisekedi
GDP (2024):	\$70 billion
Main Sectors	Mining, oil, agriculture, and forestry

2. Mineral Wealth

- **Cobalt** (DRC holds ~60% of global reserves)
- **Copper** (among top global producers)
- **Gold** (Significant, mostly artisanal)
- **Coltan (Tantalum)**
- **Tin, Tungsten**
- **Diamonds** (industrial and gem quality)
- **Lithium** (newly identified reserves in Katanga region)

3. Export Revenue (2024)

- US \$11.8 billion
- **Copper:** \$5.0 billion
- **Cobalt:** \$4.7 billion
- **Tin:** \$513 million
- **Gold:** \$1.5 billion
- **Diamonds:** \$89 million
- World Bank, U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), and other mining experts have consistently cited that the **DRC holds mineral resources valued at \$24 trillion USD.**



b. Profile of the Republic of Rwanda

1. General Overview

Location	East–Central Africa (landlocked)
Capital	Kigali
Population	Approx. 13.4 million (2025 est.)
Area	Approx. 26,000 km ²
Political System	Presidential Republic
President	Paul Kagame (since 2000)
GDP (2024):	\$15 billion
Main Sectors	Agriculture, services, tourism, and mining

2. Mineral Wealth

Rwanda’s mining industry contributes over 30% of its export earnings. The country is globally known for producing the “3Ts”

- Tin (Cassiterite),
- Tantalum (Coltan)
- Tungsten (Wolframite)

These are critical in electronics and defense sectors. Rwanda is the world’s second-largest producer of tantalum. However, its production is largely artisanal, and allegations persist about smuggled minerals from DRC being laundered through Rwanda.

3. Export Revenue (2024)

- \$1.73–1.74 billion USD
- **Gold:** \$1.5 billion
- **3Ts:** \$231 million
- The **total estimated worth of Rwanda’s mineral reserves** based on official figures from the Rwanda Mines, Petroleum & Gas Board (RMB) is approximately **US \$150 billion**.



c. Joint Statement on June 27 Rwanda-DRC Peace Deal

Joint Statement on Peace Talks between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of Rwanda, Mediated by the United States and Observed by the State of Qatar

The text of the following statement was released by the Governments of the United States of America, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the Republic of Rwanda on the occasion of peace talks held this week in Washington, D.C.

On June 18, 2025, technical teams from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of Rwanda initialed the text of the Peace Agreement, witnessed by U.S. Under Secretary for Political Affairs Allison Hooker, in preparation for the Ministerial signing of the Peace Agreement on June 27, 2025, to be witnessed by U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio.

Building on the Declaration of Principles signed on April 25, 2025, the Agreement was developed over three days of constructive dialogue regarding political, security, and economic interests. The Agreement includes provisions on respect for territorial integrity and a prohibition of hostilities; disengagement, disarmament, and conditional integration of non-state armed groups; establishment of a Joint Security Coordination Mechanism that incorporates the CONOPS of October 31, 2024; facilitation of the return of refugees and internally displaced persons, as well as humanitarian access; and a regional economic integration framework.

As part of the ongoing coordination between the facilitation efforts of the United States of America and the State of Qatar, the State of Qatar participated in these discussions to ensure complementarity and alignment between both countries' initiatives aimed at dialogue and peace in the region. Both the DRC and Rwanda expressed their appreciation for the valuable contributions and joint efforts of the United States and Qatar as partners in advancing a peaceful resolution.

We look forward to the subsequent Summit of the Heads of State in Washington, D.C. to further advance peace, stability, and economic prosperity in the Great Lakes region.

d. Brief Summary of Conflict Between Rwanda and Democratic Republic of Congo

1. The roots of the Rwanda–DRC conflict trace back to the aftermath of the 1994 Rwandan Genocide, when members of the defeated Hutu regime, including the Interahamwe militia responsible for mass atrocities, fled into eastern Zaire (now DRC). Rwanda, fearing the resurgence of Hutu insurgents like the FDLR (Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda), launched cross-border military operations into the DRC under the pretext of national security. These incursions ignited two regional wars (1996–1997, 1998–2003), turning the DRC into a proxy battleground involving multiple African states and armed factions. The mineral-rich Kivu provinces became epicenters of violence, where rebel groups, warlords, and foreign forces exploited resources such as gold, coltan, and tin, fueling a war economy.

2. In recent years, tensions reignited with the resurgence of the M23 rebel group, allegedly backed by Rwanda, which launched offensives in eastern DRC in 2022–2024, capturing strategic territory and displacing hundreds of thousands. The DRC accused Rwanda of sponsoring the rebellion to control valuable mining zones, while Rwanda maintained it was acting to protect its national interests against the FDLR. Diplomatic efforts through the African Union and East African Community stalled, as clashes intensified and regional security deteriorated.
3. The turning point came in **June 2025**, when the United States hosted high-level talks in **Washington, DC**, resulting in the signing of a **landmark peace agreement on June 27**. Brokered with the support of Qatar and the African Union, the deal included key commitments: Rwanda agreed to withdraw its forces from DRC within 90 days, both countries pledged to end support for non-state armed groups, and a Joint Security Coordination Mechanism (JSCM) was created. The peace deal also included provisions for humanitarian aid, refugee repatriation, and future economic cooperation. While implementation remains fragile, the accord represents the most significant step toward stability in the Great Lakes region in over a decade.

e. Military Coups in Africa (2020–2025)

Over the past five years, Africa has witnessed a notable resurgence of military coups, particularly across West and Central Africa. These takeovers have been driven by a mix of dissatisfaction with civilian governance, rising insecurity due to terrorism, and growing anti-Western sentiments, especially against former colonial powers. The resulting shifts in alliances have seen several countries tilt toward Russia and away from traditional Western partners like France and the United States. Below is a table summarizing the key military coups from 2020 to 2025, highlighting the country, coup leader, and their geopolitical orientation.

Date	Country	Coup Leader	Political Orientation
Aug 18, 2020	Mali	Col. Assimi Goïta	Anti-West
May 24, 2021	Mali (2nd)	Col. Assimi Goïta	Anti-West
Sep 5, 2021	Guinea	Col. Mamady Doumbouya	Neutral to Anti-West
Apr 20, 2021	Chad	Gen. Mahamat Idriss Déby	Pro-West
Jan 24, 2022	Burkina Faso	Lt. Col. Paul-Henri Damiba	Initially Neutral
Sep 30, 2022	Burkina Faso	Capt. Ibrahim Traoré	Anti-West
Jul 26, 2023	Niger	Gen. Abdourahamane Tchiani	Anti-West
Aug 30, 2023	Gabon	Gen. Brice Oligui Nguema	Neutral
Sep 5, 2023	Sudan	Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan	Shifting to Anti-West

f. Pakistan Army Role in UN Peacekeeping Missions in Africa (2000-2025)

Mission / Country	Mission Acronym	Deployment Period	Approx. Pakistani Contribution	Status
Sierra Leone	UNAMSIL	1999 – 2005	5,000 troops	Completed
Democratic Republic of Congo	MONUC / MONUSCO	2003 – April 2024	3,500 troops	Completed
Liberia	UNMIL	2003 – 2018	2,741 troops	Completed
Côte d'Ivoire	UNOCI	2004 – 2017	1,145 troops	Completed
Burundi	ONUB	2004 – 2006	1,185 troops	Completed
Sudan (Darfur)	UNAMID	2008 – 2021	1,075 military & police	Completed
Central African Republic	MINUSCA	2014 – Present	1,300 military & police	Active
South Sudan	UNMISS	2011 – Present	2,621 troops, 420 police, 20 military experts	Active
Western Sahara	MINURSO	1991 – Present	13 military troops	Active
Total number of troops served in Africa			18,580 (Approx)	
Total number of fatalities in Africa			35	

**DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC
OF THE
CONGO**

RWANDA

*Lake
Kivu*

Goma

Gisenyi

Kibuye

Nyanza

Gikongoro

Cyangugu

Bukavu



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